Версія, наведена в посиланні, є в нікаях, вона дещо відрізняється від версії з «Сам'юктагамі». Обидві містять концепцію навчання через середину між двома крайностями існування та неіснування<ref>A.K. Warder, ''A Course in Indian Philosophy.'' Motilal Banarsidass Publ., 1998, pages 55–56</ref><ref>For the full text of both versions with analysis see pages 192–195 of Choong Mun-keat, ''The Fundamental Teachings of Early Buddhism: A comparative study basted on the Sutranga portion of the Pali Samyutta-Nikaya and the Chinese Samyuktagama''; Harrassowitz Verlag, Weisbaden, 2000.</ref>. Нагарджуна, цитуючи текст агами, не використовує слово «все»<ref>[[David Kalupahana]], ''Nagarjuna: The Philosophy of the Middle Way''. SUNY Press, 1986, page 232.</ref>
Джей Л. Гарфілд описує підхід Нагарджуни до причинності як заснований на [[Чотири шляхетні істини|чотирьох шляхетних істинах]] та залежному походженні.
Jay L. Garfield describes that Nāgārjuna approached causality from the [[four noble truths]] and [[dependent origination]]. Nāgārjuna distinguished two dependent origination views in a causal process, that which causes effects and that which causes conditions. This is predicated in the [[Nagarjuna#Two truths|two truth doctrine]], as conventional truth and ultimate truth held together, in which both are empty in existence. The distinction between effects and conditions is controversial. In Nāgārjuna's approach, cause means an event or state that has power to bring an effect. Conditions, refer to proliferating causes that bring a further event, state or process; without a metaphysical commitment to an occult connection between explaining and explanans. He argues nonexistent causes and various existing conditions. The argument draws from unreal causal power. Things conventional exist and are ultimately nonexistent to rest in the [[middle way]] in both causal existence and nonexistence as casual emptiness within the [[Mūlamadhyamakakārikā]] doctrine. Although seeming strange to Westerners, this is seen as an attack on a reified view of causality.<ref>{{cite journal|last1=Garfield|first1=Jay L|title=Dependent Arising and the Emptiness of Emptiness: Why Did Nāgārjuna Start with Causation?|journal=Philosophy East and West|date=April 1994|volume=44|issue=2|page=|pages=219–250|doi=10.2307/1399593|jstor=1399593}}</ref>
